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ABSTRACT. Bruce Ackerman's volume on the civil rights revolution argues that the Second
Reconstruction was centrally concerned with the concept of institutionalized humiliation.
Ackerman inveighs against the fact that we have turned away from this "anti-humiliation
principle" in our modern civil-rights jurisprudence, with the exception of the jurisprudence
surrounding same-sex marriage. While I generally agree with Ackerman's account, I believe a
closer look at gay-rights jurisprudence might further illuminate his analysis in two ways. I first
argue that the anti-humiliation principle in the gay-rights context actually extends well beyond
the same-sex marriage debate. I then contend that this jurisprudence also suggests that the
mechanisms that Ackerman describes for establishing the anti-humiliation principle need to be
supplemented. I suggest that greater use of the civil-rights trial may be a crucial way in which
courts might discern the existence of institutionalized humiliation, taking the landmark trial in
Perry v. Schwarzenegger as my case study.
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INTRODUCTION
Bruce Ackerman's volume on the civil rights revolution casts the Second
Reconstruction as centrally concerned with the "anti-humiliation principle."'
He critiques that revolution for gradually replacing the anti-humiliation
principle with more technocratic doctrinal formulations, such as the test for
heightened scrutiny. He also outlines two avenues through which jurists might
establish the presence of institutionalized humiliation -their "situation sense"
and the Brandeis brief. In doing so, he provides an important alternative
framework for looking at constitutional civil rights discourse today. Ackerman
briefly observes that recent same-sex marriage jurisprudence represents a
domain in which this alternative framework has found new life.
In this essay, I supplement Ackerman's analysis in two ways, rooting his
analysis more firmly in the gay-rights jurisprudence and offering a different
avenue through which institutionalized humiliation might be established. In
Part I of this essay, I outline Ackerman's theory of the "anti-humiliation
principle," summarizing his critique of how the civil rights movement drifted
from the conceptual moorings erected by Brown v. Board of Education. In Part
II, I elaborate on his view that recent gay-rights jurisprudence revives the anti-
humiliation principle, and inquire whether this jurisprudence can be extended
into other domains. In Part III, I take up Ackerman's proposed means of
establishing the existence of institutionalized humiliation. In Part IV, I argue
that the civil rights trial provides an additional resource by focusing on the
celebrated trial in Perry v. Schwarzenegger.
I. THE ANTI-HUMILIATION PRINCIPLE
Perhaps the most compelling introduction to Ackerman's anti-humiliation
principle can be found in his ringing defense of the opinion in Brown v. Board
of Education.' Brown's holding needs no champion. Yet Ackerman notes
"something very curious about Brown's current status: None of the
protagonists [in legal debates] takes Chief Justice Warren's opinion
seriously."14 In the spirit of doing so, Ackerman contends that "a single master-
insight will suffice," namely, "the Court's emphasis on the distinctive
1. 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2014).
2. 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4. 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 128.
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wrongness of institutionalized humiliation." 5 Ackerman cites a famous passage
from Brown to underscore his point: "Segregation of white and colored
children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored children.
The impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law; for the policy of
separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the
negro group."' He observes that this emphasis on institutionalized humiliation
constitutes the "lost logic" of Brown.7
This logic was not the special province of the judiciary. One of the book's
core insights is that the constitutional canon should expand beyond Supreme
Court cases to encompass the political zeitgeist. Ackerman produces evidence
that key political actors-from legislative and popular realms -understood
institutionalized humiliation as the distinctive wrong of racism. Ackerman
quotes Senator Hubert Humphrey, the sponsor of the Civil Rights Act of 1964:
"It is difficult for most of us to comprehend the monstrous humiliations and
inconveniences that racial discrimination imposes on our Negro fellow
citizens."' Similarly, Ackerman points to Rosa Parks's 1955 statement, which
accompanied the act that catalyzed the Montgomery bus boycott: "it was the
very last time that I would ever ride in humiliation of this kind."9
What, exactly, is "institutionalized humiliation"? In answering that
question, Ackerman begins with the more accessible concept of "personal
humiliation," which he defines as "a face-to-face insult in which the victim
acquiesces in the effort to impugn his standing as a minimally competent actor
within a particular sphere of life."'o He then observes that the
institutionalization of such harm amplifies its effect. In the institutional
context, face-to-face interaction may not be necessary, as signs like "No
Negroes Allowed," or norms expressing the same sentiment, could achieve the
same result." Nevertheless, the other components remain necessary to his
definition. The individual must accept, rather than defy, the affront; the
affront must strike at the individual's minimal competence within a particular
sphere of life; and the affront need not (although it may) apply across the
board.
5. Id. at 128.
6. Id. at 132 (citing Brown, 347 U.S. at 494).
7. Id. at 129.
8. Id. at 136 (quoting 11o CONG. REC. 6531-32 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey)).
9. Id. at 135.
1o. Id. at 138 (emphasis omitted).
11. Id. at 140.
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Ackerman contends that the civil rights movement tragically swerved away
from this anti-humiliation principle. He discusses Loving v. Virginia12 -the
canonical 1967 case in which the Supreme Court unanimously struck down
bans on interracial marriage-as an emblematic misstep.1 3 Ackerman concedes
that Chief Justice Earl Warren's decision to avoid "excessive reliance on Brown"
was politically understandable.' 4 Because desegregation still divided the nation,
Warren relied on the Court's earlier decisions upholding the detention of
Japanese-Americans during World War 11.15 This move not only directed
attention away from the civil rights revolution and back to World War II, but
also replaced a moral principle with a more technocratic legal one concerned
with "tiers of scrutiny."
Ackerman argues that this move effaced the real harm of bans on interracial
marriage. In his view, the lived injury of anti-miscegenation laws did not lie in
the categorization itself. Rather, it resided in how "the marriage ban forced
interracial couples to present their relationship to the larger community as if it
were diseased, disreputable, criminal." 6 In his view, a "discussion of the
countless humiliations of everyday life would have yielded a far more
compelling vindication of Brown's concerns with real-world stigma . . . ."'
This reading usefully challenges entrenched conventional wisdom. Brown is
often celebrated for its result, but derogated for its reasoning. Loving is lauded
not only for its result, but also for establishing modern heightened scrutiny
jurisprudence- not least by repurposing Korematsu's notion that racial
categories were "inherently suspect." Ackerman praises Brown for capturing the
anti-humiliation principle and criticizes Loving for deviating from it in favor of
the less accusatory - but also less accurate - heightened scrutiny framework.
Carrying that analysis into the present, Ackerman seems correct that in
many contexts we have lost sight of the anti-humiliation principle in favor of a
more technocratic doctrine that speaks of prongs, tiers, and classifications. In
the context of race, Ackerman is surely right that we could not have the race-
based jurisprudence we have today if the Court had adhered to the anti-
humiliation principle. Our current Supreme Court seems increasingly intent on
12. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
13. See, e.g., 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 289 ("Loving v. Virginia ... shifted legal attention
away from the evil of institutionalized humiliation."); id. at 291 ("I do deny that Loving
deserves a central place in the civil rights canon.").
14. Id. at 290.
15. E.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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privileging the anti-classification principle (which holds that strict scrutiny is
triggered whenever the government uses a racial classification) 18 over the anti-
subordination principle (which holds that strict scrutiny is only appropriate
when the government continues to disadvantage historically subordinated
racial groups)." We can see the difference this makes in the affirmative action
context, in which the anti-classification principle is plainly violated, but the
anti-subordination principle is not. The University of Texas's affirmative
action program certainly harms whites like Abigail Fisher.2 o Yet the program
does not humiliate them, in Ackerman's sense of undermining their minimal
competence in the sphere of education.
At the same time, Ackerman correctly sees a potential revival of Brown's lost
logic in the context of same-sex marriage. He focuses his attention on the
Supreme Court's 2013 decision in United States v. Windsor, in which the Court
struck down congressional legislation that defined marriage for all federal
purposes as a union of one man and one woman. Ackerman observes that
Justice Anthony Kennedy's majority opinion in Windsor "treats Loving's
concern with suspect legislative purposes as a secondary issue, emphasizing
instead the evils of institutionalized humiliation in vindicating the claims of
same-sex couples."" Ackerman lauds Windsor as a "breakthrough," because it
invites "a new generation to restore the original understanding of Brown to its
central place in the civil rights legacy."" Returning to this theme later in the
book, Ackerman maintains: "In striking down the Defense of Marriage Act,
United States v. Windsor decisively repudiated the Hirabayashi-Korematsu
framework inherited from Loving, emphasizing instead a version of the anti-
humiliation principle inherited from Brown."' He quotes from Justice
Kennedy's opinion about the humiliations imposed by DOMA on children
being raised by same-sex couples, and writes, "This is a virtual paraphrase of
Warren's denunciation of school segregation on the ground that it gives
i8. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 229-30 (1995) ("The principle of
consistency simply means that whenever the government treats any person unequally
because of his or her race, that person has suffered an injury that falls squarely within the
language and spirit of the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection.").
ig. See, e.g., id. at 245 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The consistency that the Court espouses would
disregard the difference between a 'No Trespassing' sign and a welcome mat.").
20. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
21. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
22. 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 291.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 304.
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children 'a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may
affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."'2 s
While intriguing, Ackerman's analysis here bears elaboration. Without
understanding the framework within which Windsor was decided, it is difficult
to assess how much promise this single case holds. One could build a stronger
case for the renaissance of the "anti-humiliation principle" by focusing on the
concept of dignity in Windsor and beyond.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S EMBRACE OF THE ANTI-HUMILIATION
PRINCIPLE
The closest the Supreme Court has come to embracing the anti-humiliation
principle is through its use of the term "dignity." This link should be
intuitive-what, after all, is the opposite of "humiliation" but "dignity"?
Ackerman recognizes this nexus, but his discussion of it is tantalizingly brief."
He acknowledges that the link between human dignity and the anti-
humiliation principle may be unfamiliar to American constitutional lawyers,
given that, in contrast to other jurisdictions, our constitutional traditions are
built around the concepts of equality and liberty." He posits, however, that the
notion of the anti-humiliation principle may give the "notoriously protean
notion" of dignity "a more distinctive shape."'2 After one page of discussion, he
largely leaves the idea of dignity behind.
If we train our attention on the word "dignity," however, the potential
reach of the anti-humiliation principle can be seen more clearly. Within the
gay-rights context, we can see that the Court's invocation of dignity-and
Ackerman's anti-humiliation principle-began not with United States v.
Windsor but with a case decided a decade earlier: Lawrence v. Texas.'9 In
Lawrence, the Court struck down laws criminalizing intimate sexual activity
occurring in the home. In his majority opinion, Justice Kennedy used the word
"dignity" three times.o The mention that drew the ire of Justice Antonin
Scalia's dissent occurred in a quotation from Planned Parenthood v. Casey, which
noted that "choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the
25. Id. at 308.
26. See id. at 137.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
30. Id. at 567, 574, 575.
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liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment."" Yet for purposes of the
anti-humiliation principle, the majority opinion's other two references to
"dignity" mattered more. Both focused on the criminal sanctions that attached
to sodomy statutes: "It suffices for us to acknowledge that adults may choose
to enter upon this relationship in the confines of their homes and their own
private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons."" Later in the
opinion, Justice Kennedy reiterates that the Texas sodomy statute carried a
criminal sentence: "The offense, to be sure, is but a class C misdemeanor, a
minor offense in the Texas legal system. Still, it remains a criminal offense with
all that imports for the dignity of the persons charged.""
Lawrence overruled the Court's 1986 decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, which
upheld a Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy. Holding that a state may
constitutionally criminalize activity in a sphere of life - here sexual intimacy- is
a direct strike at an individual's "minimal competence" in that sphere. An
affront in this single sphere would be sufficient to violate Ackerman's anti-
humiliation principle, as it casts the act as "diseased, disreputable, criminal."3 4
Moreover, sodomy statutes have had "ripple effects" far beyond the criminal
context." To a significant extent, the Lawrence Court acknowledged that
reality. The majority observed that the petitioners in that case would "bear on
their record the history of their criminal convictions," meaning that they would
have to register as sex offenders in "at least four States."36 It further noted that
"the Texas criminal conviction carries with it the other collateral consequences
always following a conviction, such as notations on job application forms." 7 In
keeping with the breadth of the harm it recognized, the Lawrence Court's
dignitary remedy extended far beyond the elimination of the sodomy statutes."
31. Id. at 574 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)); id at
588 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 567.
33. Id. at 575.
34. 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 302; see supra text accompanying note 17.
35. Joseph Landau, Ripple Effect, NEw REPUBLIC, June 23, 2003, at 12, 14-16 (noting ripple effect
of sodomy statutes in collateral areas of doctrine).
36. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575.
37. Id. at 576.
38. See Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under
Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1741-42 (20o8) ("The dignity Lawrence protects concerns
questions of autonomy and self-definition and questions of social standing and respect: the
right to be treated as a full member of the polity, not excluded, subordinated, or
denigrated.").
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It is Lawrence, then, not Windsor, that revived the "lost logic" of Brown.
Indeed, commentary often describes Lawrence as a Brown of the gay-rights
movement, and describes Bowers as the Plessy of that movement.3 9 While
Ackerman acknowledges Windsor's debt to Lawrence, he largely does so to
criticize the fact that Windsor did not reach further back to the fountainhead of
Brown.4 o Yet this move seems to miss that Lawrence is to Brown as Windsor is to
Ackerman's desired rewriting of Loving, rather than Loving itself. Under such a
reading, Windsor is redeeming time, carrying the anti-humiliation principle
into the marriage context as Loving did not.
Again, Windsor's debt to Lawrence and its embrace of the anti-humiliation
principle can be tracked through the use of the term "dignity." In Windsor,
Justice Kennedy doubled down on Lawrence, mentioning the word "dignity" or
"indignity" almost a dozen times.41 As Reva Siegel has argued in an important
39. See, e.g., Watkins v. U.S. Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1358 (9th Cir. 1988), withdrawn on reh'g, 875
F.2d 699 ( 9 th Cir. 1989) ("1 believe that history will view Hardwick much as it views Plessy
v. Ferguson . . . . And I am confident that, in the long run, Hardwick, like Plessy, will be
overruled by a wiser and more enlightened Court."); Michael J. Klarman, Brown and
Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH. L. REV. 431, 489 (2005) ("It may not be too much
longer before . .. Lawrence evolves into the Brown of the twenty-first century.").
40. 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 308 ("In moving beyond the law world to the lifeworld, Justice
Kennedy [in Windsor] treated his earlier decision in Lawrence v. Texas as decisive precedent.
In that case, he had led the Court to strike down traditional criminal laws against 'sodomy'
since their enforcement 'demean[ed]' same-sex couples. But his reliance on this relatively
recent decision ignored Windsor's deeper roots [in Brown.]").
41. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2689 (2013) ("It seems fair to conclude that,
until recent years, many citizens had not even considered the possibility that two persons of
the same sex might aspire to occupy the same status and dignity as that of a man and
woman in lawful marriage."); id. at 2692 ("Here the State's decision to give this class of
persons the right to marry conferred upon them a dignity and status of immense import.");
id. ("When the State used its historic and essential authority to define the marital relation in
this way, its role and its power in making the decision enhanced the recognition, dignity,
and protection of the class in their own community."); id. ("That result requires this Court
now to address whether the resulting injury and indignity is a deprivation of an essential
part of the liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment."); id. ("By its recognition of the
validity of same-sex marriages performed in other jurisdictions and then by authorizing
same-sex unions and same-sex marriages, New York sought to give further protection and
dignity to that bond."); id. ("This status is a far-reaching legal acknowledgment of the
intimate relationship between two people, a relationship deemed by the State worthy of
dignity in the community equal with all other marriages."); id. at 2693 ("The history of
DOMA's enactment and its own text demonstrate that interference with the equal dignity of
same-sex marriages, a dignity conferred by the States in the exercise of their sovereign
power, was more than an incidental effect of the federal statute."); id. at 2694
("Responsibilities, as well as rights, enhance the dignity and integrity of the person."); id. at
2696 ("The federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and
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precursor to Ackerman's analysis, Windsor thereby articulated a return to an
older jurisprudence of equality.42 Of course, Windsor arguably left open
whether the real problem with DOMA rested in principles of federalism or in
the principle of anti-humiliation.4 1 Yet as of this writing lower courts have
uniformly interpreted Windsor to invalidate state bans on same-sex marriage,
often citing Windsor's references to "dignity.""
To be sure, the insistence on dignity in the Supreme Court's recent gay-
rights cases may not constitute a grand endorsement of the anti-humiliation
principle. The Windsor Court likely eschewed the heightened scrutiny
framework embraced by the lower court 4s and urged upon it by the
effect to disparage and to injure those whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought to
protect in personhood and dignity.").
42. See Reva B. Siegel, The Supreme Court, 2012 Term -Foreword: Equality Divided, 127 HARv. L.
REV. 1, 77 (2013) ("What distinguishes Windsor from the race cases of the 2012 Term is not
the subject matter or reach of the decision, but its determination to redress the dignitary and
material injuries law inflicts on a minority group. In Windsor, a closely divided Court
reasons about equal protection in ways the Court has not reasoned in its race discrimination
decisions in a very long time."); see also id. at 90-91 ("[Windsor] begins from the
appreciation that, in the American constitutional order, community judgment about the
meaning of 'unjust exclusion' can evolve. The opinion recapitulates that learning process, as
it endeavors to understand, and to make plain to others, how law can express and enforce
inequality in 'status,' as Brown did. These concerns are essential prerequisites of equal
protection, more fundamental than any standard of review.").
43. See, e.g., Courtney G. Joslin, Windsor, Federalism and Family Equality, 113 COLUM. L. REv.
SIDEBAR 156, 164 (2013) (noting competing views on whether Windsor "turns on
principles of federalism"); David S. Cohen & Dahlia Lithwick, It's Over: Gay Marriage
Can't Lose in the Courts, SLATE (Feb. 14, 2014), http://www.slate.com/articles/news
and-politics/jurisprudence/2ol4/02/virginia s-gay-marriage ban ruled unconstitutional
a-perfect record for.html (noting that Justice Kennedy's "less than crystal clear
reasoning" left ambiguous whether Windsor was rooted in federalism concerns).
44. See DeBoer v. Snyder, No. 12-CV-10285, 2014 WL 1100794 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 21, 2014); De
Leon v. Perry, SA-13 -CA-oo982-OLG, 2014 WL 715741, at *20, *23 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 26,
2014) ("This Court finds that Texas cannot define marriage in a way that denies its citizens
the 'freedom of personal choice' in deciding whom to marry, nor may it deny the 'same
status and dignity' to each citizen's decision."); Bostic v. Rainey, No. 2:13-CV-395, 2014 WL
561978 (E.D. Va. Feb. 13, 2014); Bishop v. United States ex rel. Holder, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252,
1278 (N.D. Okla. 2014) ("The Windsor majority opinion, authored by Justice Kennedy, held
that . . . when a state recognizes same-sex marriage, it confers upon this class of persons 'a
dignity and status of immense import."'); Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968, 982
(S.D. Ohio 2013) ("As the Supreme Court held in Windsor, marriage confers 'a dignity and
status of immense import."'); Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1193 (D. Utah 2013)
("In other words, Utah believes that it is up to each individual state to decide whether two
persons of the same sex may 'occupy the same status and dignity as that of a man and
woman in lawful marriage."').
45. Windsor v. United States, 699 F. 3d 169, 180-85 (2d Cir. 2012).
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government brief 6 because such a move would effectively commit it to the
invalidation of state marriage bans in all fifty states. Eschewing such a rigid
standard of review allowed the Court to approach the issue in a more
minimalist fashion.4 7 At the same time, if the Court were only looking for a
stalling tactic, it had many avenues available to it. It could, for instance, have
focused much more of its analysis on the federalism aspect of the decision. The
majority opinion's drumbeat insistence on dignity-as Justice Scalia's dissent
elaborated through a mad lib substituting the state for the federal
sovereign"' -practically seems to require the so-called "fifty-state solution."49
Of course, the Court might at any point put the brakes on the anti-
humiliation principle. This could be true even in the gay-rights context. Once
de jure restrictions on gay rights are removed, the Court may become blind to
second-generation discrimination against gay individuals. If this were the case,
the gay-rights jurisprudence would track the race-discrimination
46. Brief for the United States on the Merits Question at 18-36, United States v. Windsor, 133 S.
Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307); cf Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att'y Gen. of the United
States, to John A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 23,
2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/1-ag-223.html ("I will instruct the
Department's lawyers to immediately inform the district courts in Windsor and Pedersen of
the Executive Branch's view that heightened scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review
and that, consistent with that standard, Section 3 of DOMA may not be constitutionally
applied to same-sex couples whose marriages are legally recognized under state law.").
47. Cf Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term -Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided,
110 HARv. L. REv. 4, 99 (1996) ("Minimalism is best understood as an effort to leave things
open by limiting the width and depth of judicial judgments. Minimalist judges try to keep
their judgments as narrow and as incompletely theorized as possible, consistent with the
obligation to offer reasons.").
48. See, e.g., Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2709-10 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("DOMA's This state law's
principal effect is to identify a subset of etate CntiRned marriagee constitutionally protected
sexual relationships, see Lawrence, and make them unequal. The principal purpose is to
impose inequality, not for other reasons like governmental efficiency. Responsibilities, as
well as rights, enhance the dignity and integrity of the person. And DOMA this state law
contrives to deprive some couples married under the Lawe of their State enjoying
constitutionally protected sexual relationships, but not other couples, of both rights and
responsibilities.").
49. Michael J. Klarman, Windsor and Brown: Marriage Equality and Racial Equality, 127 HARV.
L. REv. 127, 128 (2013); see also Siegel, supra note 42, at 88 ("The opinion does not bind
future judgments about these restrictions by the formal technique of adopting heightened
scrutiny. But neither does the opinion practice deference associated with rational basis
review, even rational basis of an elevated kind. The Court extends the potential reach of its
decision by tying the judgment of unconstitutionality to features of DOMA that the statute
shares with other legislation -and by reasoning about the meaning of the Constitution's
equality guarantees in ways the Court has not for years.").
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jurisprudence.so The contemporary jurisprudence around race may be the
future of gay constitutional rights, not its past.
Even if the Court continues to be sympathetic to the equal rights of gay
individuals, the Court's sympathies may be limited to this context. The gay
rights domain may provide a particularly sympathetic context from which
dignitary claims would arise, given that gay rights have always been plagued by
a politics of shame." In a more practical sense, the fact that gay individuals are
dispersed throughout families and institutions across the United States may
make their claims to dignity more intelligible than the traditional "discrete and
insular minority.""
Nevertheless, it bears note that the use of "dignity" in Lawrence cannot be
dismissed as a quirk. The United States Supreme Court has used the word
"dignity" in its jurisprudence in more than nine hundred opinions; since the
1940s, its use of the word has increased." The Court has deployed the term in a
wide array of contexts, and Justice Kennedy appears to be particularly drawn to
it. I have already alluded to the use of "dignity" in the Casey joint opinion
(which Justice Kennedy co-wrote). Justice Kennedy has deployed the word
"dignity" repeatedly in cases ranging from prison conditions54 to partial-birth
5o. Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing
State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1142-47 (1997) (observing that the Supreme Court's race
jurisprudence has disestablished de jure segregation, while permitting "facially neutral"
state action that perpetuates racial stratification, and constraining legislatures from adopting
race-based remedial measures).
51. MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS, AND THE ETHICS OF QUEER
LIFE 48-74 (1999) (expressing the challenge of claiming dignity for people defined in part by
"undignified and abject sex").
52. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154 n-4 (1938). In an interesting
turn, Professor Ackerman argued some time ago that "anonymous and diffuse minorities" -
including gay individuals -might be more vulnerable in the political process than "discrete
and insular minorities." See Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARv. L.
REV. 713, 722-31 (1985). I have more recently contended that this assessment might be
contingent. See Kenji Yoshino, The Gay Tipping Point, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1537 (2010).
Ackerman's analysis might hold before a certain critical mass of gay individuals came out of
the closet. Id. at 1540-41. After they reached a "tipping point," however, the anonymity and
diffuseness of gay individuals might begin to work for them. Id. at 1541-42 (arguing that the
capacity of gays to pass -their anonymity -precludes gatekeeping mechanisms from being
used against them, and their diffuseness means every extended family in America includes a
gay person).
53. Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence ofDignity, 16o U. PA. L. REv. 169, 178-79 (2011).
54. See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1928 (2011).
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abortions." A distinct pattern emerges-when Justice Kennedy ascribes dignity
to an entity, that entity generally prevails.s
Ackerman clearly understands that Windsor provides an immensely
promising vehicle for his "anti-humiliation principle." However, his points
about the traction of the anti-humiliation principle in the gay-rights context
would have had even greater force if he had situated it within the discourse of
dignity. Such context would have permitted Ackerman to have seen that the
Supreme Court's embrace of this idea extends far beyond the single case of
Windsor.
III. PROPOSED WAYS OF ESTABLISHING THE ANTI-HUMILIATION
PRINCIPLE
If we accept the constitutional dimension of the anti-humiliation principle,
we must establish a procedure to discern humiliation. Ackerman focuses on
two sources from which the Justices might glean this knowledge -the judge's
"situation-sense" and "Brandeis briefs." In this Part, I argue that the gay-rights
context has revealed both the strengths and the weaknesses of these sources of
factual information, suggesting that a search for an alternative may be in order.
A. Situation-Sense
Returning to his celebration of Brown, Ackerman notes that Chief Justice
Earl Warren establishes the humiliation encountered by black children in part
through an application of judicial common sense. Ackerman begins this
argument with Warren's justly celebrated statement: "To separate them
[blacks] from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their
race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that
may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.""
Ackerman observes:
[In this portion of the opinion,] Warren was simply calling upon
judges, and the rest of us, to make common-sense judgments about the
prevailing meaning of social practices. One of the greatest legal thinkers
55. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 157 (2007) ("The Act expresses respect for the dignity
of human life.").
s6. Noah Feldman, The United States ofJustice Kennedy, BLOOMBERG (May 30, 2011, 3:48 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2o11-o5-3o/how-it-became-the-united-states-of-justice
-kennedy-noah-feldman.html.
57. 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 131 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954)).
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of the era, Karl Llewellyn, persuasively argued that judges couldn't
decide the most humdrum case without relying on this capacity, which
he famously called "situation-sense." Without using their common
sense, judges couldn't hope to decide the simplest cases-for example,
whether a defendant was a charlatan who had defrauded an innocent
victim or whether he was acting reasonably under the circumstances.
Warren's contribution in this phase of the argument involved
constitutional principle, not judicial method. He was insisting that the
Constitution called upon the Justices to use their situation-sense to
determine whether segregated schools systematically humiliated black
children."'
Ackerman believes Brown departs from Plessy in this moment. Specifically,
Brown jettisons Plessy's understanding that if any inferiority inhered in
"separate but equal," "it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but
solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it.""
The trouble with "situation-sense," however, is its gross subjectivity. After
all, Justice Brown's reviled quotation in Plessy also flowed from his "situation-
sense" of whether segregation violated the anti-humiliation principle. It may be
true that judges must use their common sense in even the most "humdrum"
case. Yet given that this common sense is inevitably affected by the zeitgeist in
which the judge is making the decision, situation-sense would seem like a weak
lever to use against the status quo.
In the gay-rights context, "situation-sense" arguably led to the movement's
greatest jurisprudential setback. It is now familiar history that Justice Lewis
Powell stated to his closeted gay clerk that he did not think he knew any
homosexuals before casting the deciding vote in the 1986 case Bowers v.
Hardwick.6o That opinion gave the Court's imprimatur to the institutionalized
humiliation of gay individuals for seventeen years until it was overruled by
Lawrence. In his conclusion to Lawrence, Justice Kennedy observes that
measures once thought "necessary and proper" can be revealed as only serving
to oppress.' That nod to changing mores acknowledged that Justice Powell's
situation-sense was conventional for 1986, in the way that Justice Brown's
situation-sense was conventional for 1896.
58. Id. at 131.
59. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896); 3 ACKERMAN, supra note i, at 132.
6o. See, e.g., EDwARD LAzARUs, CLOSED CHAMBERS 386 (2d ed. 2005); Adam Liptak, Exhibit A
for a Major Shift: Justices' Gay Clerks, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2013, at Ai.
61. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003).
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B. The Brandeis Brief
Ackerman adduces a separate ground on which a court might establish the
existence of institutionalized humiliation. He focuses on social science, drawing
on Kenneth Clark's famous doll studies introduced at the trial level in Brown.
Perhaps because Clark's findings were later discredited, 6 Ackerman pivots
away from the battle of the experts at trial and toward the "Brandeis brief." As
Ackerman notes:
It was Louis Brandeis, not Thurgood Marshall, who first used social
science to convince courts to consider the real-world impact of their
doctrines. As early as 1908, the Supreme Court relied heavily on his
famous "Brandeis Brief' in upholding maximum-hours laws for
women. During the following decades, the law schools became centers
of sociological and economic critique of the regnant legal formalism
. . . . With the triumph of the New Deal, the Progressive use of social
science was transformed into jurisprudential bedrock- expertise was
the lifeblood of the new administrative state, and New Deal courts
recognized the relevance of social science on a broad front. Brown was
continuing this tradition.'
Unlike the gestalt "situation-sense" of the judges, the Brandeis brief promised
hard facts, which could persuade a judge to ground his determination on the
stratum of social science.
Recent scholarship, however, has taken a hard line on the Brandeis brief.
Brianne Gorod has argued that the Supreme Court often relies on amicus briefs
for dubious "facts," ignoring the problem that these facts have not been
subjected to adversarial testing at trial.64 To take just one of many examples,
Gorod notes that Justice Kennedy stated in the Gonzales v. Carhart case that
some women come to regret their abortions, citing a Brandeis brief making this
assertion.6' As Gorod points out, opposing counsel was never given the
opportunity to respond to this brief before its factual assertion became part of
the "bedrock" on which the Partial Birth Abortion Act was upheld.66 John
62. See Gwen Bergner, Black Children, White Preference: Brown v. Board, the Doll Tests, and the
Politics of Self-Esteem, 61 AM. Q 299, 300-01 (2009).
63. 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 132-33.
64. See Brianne J. Gorod, The Adversarial Myth: Appellate Court Extra-Record Facfinding, 61
DuKE L.J. 1 (2011).
65. Id. at 32.
66. Id. at 32-33.
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Jackson has argued that the Brandeis brief offers "too little, too late" for the
same reason and has urged greater use of the civil trial.6 7
In the same-sex marriage context, Brandeis briefs have also been accepted
somewhat uncritically. In the Perry v. Schwarzenegger case, the court held a
twelve-day trial in which the plaintiffs forwarded seventeen witnesses and the
proponents of Proposition 8 advanced only two. 68 Yet many of the issues on
which the litigants did not proffer witnesses were raised for the first time
through the filing of over a hundred amicus briefs on appeal. To take an
instance relevant to the anti-humiliation principle, one brief relied heavily on a
book published in 2013 entitled What Is Marriage?6 9 The main argument of the
brief-and of the book-was that the same-sex marriage debate had everything
to do with marriage and nothing to do with gay people. The brief vigorously
defended a "conjugal" vision of marriage, according to which marriage is by
nature a union of a man and a woman who create a "mind-and-body union"
ordered to procreation.7 o The book on which the brief was based argued that
promoting the conjugal vision in law would diminish the humiliation of gay
individuals because it would make people less likely to "mistakenly read into
the law an endorsement of animus."" Yet unlike the witnesses at trial, the
authors of the brief were not subjected to the rigors of cross-examination under
oath. (Indeed, in a subsequent trial, the district court disqualified the primary
author of the book as an expert witness.72 ) Nonetheless, Justice Alito (joined by
67. See John Frazier Jackson, The Brandeis Brief-Too Little, Too Late: The Trial Court as a
Superior Forum for Presenting Legislative Facts, 17 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 1 (1993).
68. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 932 (N.D. Cal. 2010). The proponents of
Proposition 8 argued that their witnesses could be subject to "harassment, economic
reprisal, threat and even physical violence" if the trial were broadcast, and some witnesses
on the proponents' side said they would withdraw for the same reason. The plaintiffs
argued that such concerns were "utterly unsubstantiated and groundless speculation." See
Adam Liptak, Justices to Review Plan for Webcasts of a Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2o1o/ol/12/us/12camera.html.
69. SHERIF GIRGIS, RYAN T. ANDERSON & ROBERT P. GEORGE, WHAT IS MARRIAGE?: MAN AND
WOMAN: A DEFENSE (2012).
70. Brief of Robert P. George et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Hollingsworth v.
Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12-144).
71. GIRGIS, ANDERSON & GEORGE, supra note 69, at 88.
72. According to the book's "Note on Authorship," Girgis was listed as first author to "reflect
his primary role in developing our arguments, and in drafting the book and the article on
which it expands." Id. at ix. Girgis was disqualified during the trial proceedings in DeBoer v.
Snyder in the Eastern District of Michigan. Ed White, Michigan's Witness in Gay Marriage
Trial Barred, YAHoo! NEWS (Mar. 3, 2014), http://news.yahoo.com/michigans-witness-gay
-marriage-trial-barred-171156615.html. The district court in DeBoer ultimately ruled in favor
of plaintiffs, holding that Michigan's constitutional same-sex marriage ban violated the
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Justice Thomas) went out of his way in his Windsor dissent to endorse this
reasoning, citing the book.7
IV. THE CIVIL RIGHTS TRIAL AND THE ANTI-HUMILIATION
PRINCIPLE
I will now argue that one underutilized source for establishing
institutionalized humiliation is the civil rights trial. I return to the quaint idea
that trials provide an excellent way of establishing facts, including facts relating
to the existence of institutionalized humiliation. I call this idea quaint because,
as John Langbein has recently documented, the incidence of civil trials has
plummeted.74 Langbein affirms this trend, since he believes pre-trial
procedures have effectively obviated the need for most trials.7 s Nonetheless, it
is hard to imagine pre-trial proceedings that could have matched the transcript
of the twelve-day trial in Perry v. Schwarzenegger in terms of settling the many
disputed facts regarding same-sex marriage, including the existence of
institutionalized humiliation.
One fascinating aspect of the Perry trial is the way in which the plaintiffs'
attorneys intuited the importance of establishing institutionalized humiliation.
If governing law clearly embraced the anti-humiliation principle, then the
testimony adduced on this topic would be of obvious relevance. However, if
one adopted a "heightened scrutiny" analysis, then the relevance of such
testimony would be questionable. After all, even under the highest form of
scrutiny, the standard only asks whether the classification is "narrowly tailored
to further compelling governmental interests."76 The question of whether the
state action inflicts no humiliation or enormous humiliation is at least arguably
irrelevant.
Nevertheless, the plaintiffs' lawyers put the issue of humiliation before the
court in the most aggressive way imaginable. In his opening statement,
plaintiffs' attorney Theodore Olson observed: "What Prop 8 does is label gay
and lesbian persons as different, inferior, unequal and disfavored. . . . It
Equal Protection Clause. DeBoer v. Snyder, No. 12-CV-1o285, 2014 WL 1100794, at *17
(E.D. Mich. Mar. 21, 2014).
73. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2718-19 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting).
74. John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Trial in the United States, 122 YALE L.J. 522
(2012).
75. Id. at 570 (contending that discovery techniques -interrogatories, documentary discovery,
and sworn depositions -constitute a "truth-revealing process" so powerful that they
ultimately displace the trial by promoting settlement).
76. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003).
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stigmatizes gays and lesbians. It classifies them as outcasts. It causes needless
and unrelenting pain and isolation and humiliation.""
Drawing on the trial, I will argue that the civil rights trial has at least three
signal attributes that make it an important supplement to a judge's "situation-
sense" or to a Brandeis brief. First, the trial allows plaintiffs and lay witnesses
to speak directly on the record about their own experiences with
institutionalized humiliation. Second, the trial allows experts on
institutionalized humiliation- such as historians, political scientists, or
psychologists -to contextualize those individual voices. Finally, the possibility
of cross-examination subjects the testimony on both sides to adversarial
testing.
A. Individual Voices
Trials permit individual plaintiffs to testify to what Ackerman calls "the
countless humiliations of everyday life."' Judges or jury members who might
not be jarred from their mindset by their situation-sense or the written words
on the page might nonetheless hear the words of living, breathing human
beings differently. Appellate courts defer to factfinders at trial for a simple
reason: they were there."
The first four witnesses to take the stand-the plaintiffs-all testified
directly to the issue of humiliation. Jeffrey Zarrillo described how the inability
to marry affected him in his daily interactions across a wide array of spheres:
One example is when Paul and I travel, it's always an awkward
situation at the front desk at the hotel.
There's on numerous occasions where the individual working at the
desk will look at us with a perplexed look on his face and say, "You
ordered a king-size bed. Is that really what you want?" And that's
certainly an awkward situation for us. And we - it is. It's very awkward.
There's been occasions where I've had to open a bank account. Paul
and I had to open a bank account. And it was certainly an awkward
situation walking to the bank and saying, "My partner and I want to
77. Transcript of Proceedings at 45, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal.
2010) (No. C 09-2292-VRW).
78. 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 302.
79. See United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948) (adopting the equity
practice of appellate deference to trial court findings "when dependent upon oral testimony
where the candor and credibility of the witnesses would best be judged").
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open a joint bank account," and hearing, you know, "Is it a business
account? A partnership?"
It would just be a lot easier to describe the situation-might not
make it less awkward for those individuals, but it would make it-
crystallize it more by being able to say, "My husband and I are here to
check in for our room. My husband and I are here to open a bank
account."so
With Zarrillo's testimony we get a different sense of "institutionalized
humiliation" than the one we get from the Supreme Court's pronouncements
about "indignity."
Directly after Zarrillo testified, his then-partner (now husband) Paul
Katami took the stand. Katami crisply demonstrated why personal testimony is
such a powerful means of capturing humiliation. On direct examination,
Katami's attorney asked him whether the capacity to marry would alter his
relationships to third parties. Counsel for the Proponents lodged an objection
on the grounds that Katami was a lay witness, not an expert one. Katami
responded with a cri de coeur:
I know how I felt when people have asked, "An LLC or an S
corporation?" ["]No, not my business partner. My partner." A puzzled
look because we're gay.
Unless you have to deal with that, unless you have to go through a
constant validation of self, there's no way to really describe how it feels.
And I'm a proud man. I'm proud to be gay. I'm a natural born gay. I
love Jeff more than myself.
And being excluded in that way is so incredibly harmful to me. I
can't speak as an expert. I can speak as a human being that's lived it.,'
In speaking as a "human being that's lived it," Katami alluded to a different
kind of expertise. Throughout the trial, charges of bias were directed against
both sides as well as the judge. Yet at the risk of stating the obvious, being gay
may illuminate an experience just as much as it may obscure it.
Katami also discussed a different effect of institutionalized humiliation,
observing that the inability to marry had caused him and Jeff to delay having
children. He testified:
I think the timeline for us has always been marriage first, before family.
For many reasons. But, for us, marriage is so important because it
So. Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 77, at 84.
Si. Id. at 91.
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solidifies the relationship. And it-we gain access to, again, that
language that is global, where it won't affect our children in the future.
They won't have to say, "My dad and dad are domestic partners."
This testimony suggested the theme that Justice Kennedy would later take up
in Windsor: by creating the potential for the humiliation of children, bans on
same-sex marriage harm rather than protect them. Katami later made this even
clearer, observing that "we need to be married before we have kids" in part
because "we . .. want our children to be protected . ...
The next witness, Kristin Perry, actually used the term "humiliating" in
describing the indignities she suffered.
I believe for me, personally as a lesbian, that if I had grown up in a
world where the most important decision I was going to make as an
adult was treated the same way as everybody else's decision, that I
would not have been treated the way I was growing up or as an adult.
There's something so humiliating about everybody knowing that
you want to make that decision and you don't get to [do] that, you
know, it's hard to face the people at work and the people even here
right now. And many of you have this, but I don't.
So I have to still find a way to feel okay and not take every bit of
discriminatory behavior toward me too personally because in the end
that will only hurt me and my family.
So if Prop 8 were undone and kids like me growing up in
Bakersfield right now could never know what this felt like, then I
assume that their entire lives would be on a higher arc[]. They would
live with a higher sense of themselves that would improve the quality of
their entire life.84
Like Katami, Perry emphasized the inter-spherical effects of institutionalized
humiliation, observing that the invalidation of Proposition 8 would put a new
generation of children "on a higher arc." Indeed one theme articulated
repeatedly throughout this litigation was the effect that Proposition 8 had on
the futures that gay children could imagine for themselves.s
82. Id. at 89.
83. Id. at 90.
84. Id. at 159.
85. See id. at 827 (testimony of Ilan Meyer) ("[T]he word 'marriage' is something that many
people aspire to. Doesn't mean that everybody achieves that, but at least I would say it's a
very common, social, socially-approved goal ... for children as they think about their future
and for people as they develop relationships. For young people . . . if you attain it, it's
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Perry's partner (now wife) Sandra Stier offered an account of humiliation
similar to Zarrillo's. She spoke less in broad terms about humiliation than
about the specific daily indignities inflicted by her inability to marry. One of
her key examples concerned how she regularly encountered forms that did not
include her own relationship status - domestic partner - as an option. Stier also
testified about how she had sought to wed Kris Perry in 2004, when Mayor
Gavin Newsom stated that San Francisco would perform marriages for same-
sex couples. Stier later received a letter noting the marriage was invalid. In
2008, Stier was again offered the opportunity to marry Perry, in the brief
window between June and November when marriage was legal in the state.
Stier testified that she and Perry could not bring themselves to seize that
opportunity: "We thought about it and discussed it. And I really felt very
strongly that at my age I don't want to be humiliated any more. It's not
okay."86 Stier could easily have quoted Rosa Parks - "it was the very last time
that I would ever ride in humiliation of this kind.""'
During closing argument, Ted Olson played clips of the four plaintiffs. He
stated, "If we had the time, Your Honor, I could not present a more compelling
closing argument than simply replaying the testimony in its entirety [of] the
four plaintiffs .... Nonetheless, he continued: "But we have so much more.
There were eight experts, persons who have studied and written about
American history, marriage, psychology, sociology, economics and political
science throughout their entire professional lives."8 9
Olson's acknowledgement of the presence of experts in addition to the
plaintiffs and lay witnesses was important. The danger of relying on potentially
idiosyncratic individual stories is that judges make decisions that affect
something that gives you pride and respect."); id. at 1914 (testimony of Hak-Shing William
Tam) ("It is very important that our children won't grow up to fantasize or think about,
[s]hould I marry Jane or John when I grow up?"); Milestone for LGBT Equality: Prop.
8, DOMA Will Have Their Day in Court, HUM. RTs. CAMPAIGN (Dec. 7, 2012),
http://www.hrc.org/press-releases/entry/milestone-for-Igbt-equality-prop.-8-doma-will
-have-their-day-in-court (quoting Human Rights Campaign President Chad Griffin)
("Now the Supreme Court has an opportunity to ... send a resounding message of hope to
LGBT young people from coast to coast that they have the same dignity and same
opportunities for the future as everyone else.").
86. Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 77, at 169.
87. 3 ACKERMAN, supra note I, at 135.
88. Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 77, at 2976.
8g. Id. There were in fact nine expert witnesses. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921,
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millions.9 o Moreover, precisely because individual stories are so intimate and
emotional, there may be "strategic risks" for opposing counsel who challenge
them.91 Olson seems to have intuited that he carried the unspoken burden of
showing that the individual voices were also representative ones.
B. Expert Framing ofIndividual Testimony
The literary scholar Elaine Scarry distinguishes "narrative compassion,"
which flows from individual stories, from "statistical compassion," which flows
from aggregate data.92 In her view, President Ronald Reagan had the former
but not the latter. He could, for instance, immediately and genuinely relate to
an individual's story about homelessness, as even his detractors admitted. Yet,
in Scarry's view, President Reagan lacked statistical compassion. He could be
offered sheaves of statistics about homelessness but not be able to apprehend
the suffering represented therein. Scarry argues that a just decisionmaker must
have both faculties.
At multiple junctures during the trial, the plaintiffs' attorneys drew on
individual stories to activate narrative compassion. Yet they never neglected to
buttress those individual narratives with hard data. Plaintiff Paul Katami's
testimony about experiencing a hate crime93 was bolstered by political scientist
Gary Segura's federal statistics showing that LGBT individuals are among the
most common victims of such crimes.1 Lay witness Helen Zia's testimony
about how her family fully accepted her long-term partner only after Zia
married her" was shored up by historian Nancy Cott's claim that in our
go. See Owen M. Fiss, Reason in All Its Splendor, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 789, 802-03 (1990).
91. The Supreme Court raised this concern in the context of considering the constitutionality of
victim impact statements, which are similarly difficult to challenge in court. See Booth v.
Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 506-07 (1987), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 5o U.S. 8o8
(1991).
92. Elaine Scarry, Speech Acts in Criminal Cases, in LAw's STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN
THE LAw 165, 166 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996).
93. Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 77, at 93-94 ("We were struck by these rocks and eggs.
And there were slurs. And again we couldn't see who the people were, but we were
definitely hit. And it was a very sobering moment because I just accepted that as, well, that's
part of our struggle.").
94. Id. at 1570-71 ("71 percent of all hate-motivated murders in the United States were of gay
men and lesbians in 2008. Fifty-five percent of all hate-motivated rapes were against gays
and lesbians in 2008. There is simply no other person in society who endures the likelihood
of being harmed as a consequence of their identity than a gay man or lesbian.").
gs. Id. at 1232-37.
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national tradition, "there is nothing that is like marriage except marriage. ,
Lay witness Ryan Kendall's testimony about how the "therapy" to convert his
sexual orientation was unavailing and traumatic" was shored up by expert
psychologist Gregory Herek, who opined that such therapies were generally
ineffective and harmful.9'
The plaintiffs adopted a similar strategy with regard to their account of
humiliation. Social epidemiologist Ilan Meyer contextualized the plaintiffs'
testimony in the social science research on structural stigma. Meyer, who
testified on the fourth day of the trial, had reviewed the transcripts of the
plaintiffs' testimony from the first day. In this way, he was able to frame these
individual narratives in the context of social science research.
For instance, Meyer acknowledged that many of the interactions that the
plaintiffs had described might seem trivial to an ordinary person -correcting a
hotel clerk about a king-size bed, explaining that your partnership was not a
business relationship, or filling out a form in a doctor's office. However, Meyer
underscored that these seemingly small indignities had a cumulative effect.
With regard to the hotel clerk, Meyer observed: "So, again, a clerk, in a hotel
asking you about a king-size bed for any couple would really mean nothing.
But for a gay person, it's an area of great sensitivity because it really talks to
their rejection and their rejection of their family members, the people that they
feel close to."9 9 Similarly, Meyer observed that in his own studies on stigma,
gay individuals insistently complained about filling out forms that contained
no designation that described them. He analyzed Stier's testimony:
I guess you have to ask yourself, why would a person remember that
type of minor incident? And, as I mentioned before, I think the
meaning of this incident is more important than, in this case, what has
actually happened. So, like I said, if there was some error on this form,
where it says "Mr." or "Mrs." and somehow the words were not clear
and she had to fix that, I don't think that she would have reported that
as a major-something that she remembers. But I think it is, again, the
message that the forms, in a sense, echoes about rejection and about
I'm not equal to other people, to most people who fill this form."oo
g6. Id. at 208.
97. Id. at 1512-13.
98. See, e.g., id. at 2252-54.
99. Id. at 844.
1oo. Id. at 851.
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Meyer's testimony illuminates the intelligence of Humphrey's juxtaposition of
"monstrous humilations and inconveniences." Meyer testified that the daily
inconveniences -in their infinitesimal and infinite nature-were a significant
avenue through which gay individuals experience humiliation.
The plaintiffs were clearly mindful that they needed to show not only
personal humiliation, but also institutionalized humiliation. Indeed, they
needed to show governmentally imposed humiliation to meet the state-action
requirement of the constitutional challenges they made. So Meyer was asked a
battery of questions about whether Proposition 8 increased the stigma
experienced by gay and lesbian individuals. Meyer testified: "Well, I think it is
quite obvious that Proposition 8, by definition, blocks the marriage institution
for gay men and lesbians. This is basically what it says. So, in that sense, it
certainly will be responsible for gay men and lesbian not marrying." Meyer
elaborated that Proposition 8 also meant that gay individuals would have "to
explain why [they] have not married. And by explaining why [they] have not
married, [they] also have to explain, I'm really not seen as equal I'm-my
status is - is not respected by my state or by my country, by my fellow
citizens.""' Meyer additionally pointed to the tutelary effects that Proposition 8
had on individuals who were not gay: "So, in that sense, it's not just damaging
to gay people because they feel bad about their rejection. It also sends a
message that it is okay to reject. Not only that it is okay, that this is very highly
valued by our Constitution to reject gay people, to designate them a different
class of people in terms of their intimate relationships."102
At the end of his direct examination, plaintiffs' counsel asked Meyer how
invalidating Proposition 8 would affect structural stigma against
homosexuality. Meyer responded:
I think that if California-and, also, consistent with the things I said
earlier in terms of the proscriptive elements of Proposition 8, of the law
having a constitutional amendment that basically says, you know, to
gay people, you are not welcome here, that the opposite of that clearly
would send a positive message. You are welcome here. Your
relationships are valued. You are valued. We don't approve with
rejection-sorry. We don't approve rejection of you as a gay person as a
state. And that has a very significant power.
As we all know, the law in the state is a very important party to
creating the social environment. . . . So clearly it's not the only thing
l1. Id. at 846-47.
102. Id. at 863.
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that determines even experiences of prejudice and discrimination, but it
is certainly a very major player, major factor, in creating this social
environment that I described as prejudicial or stigmatizing.o 3
The plaintiffs' attorneys clearly felt this testimony was crucial, as they plucked
out both the testimony of the plaintiffs and Meyer's testimony in making their
closing arguments to the court.' 4 Again, they insisted on underscoring these
violations of the anti-humiliation principle even though this principle did not
have a clear place in the regnant heightened scrutiny paradigm.
C. Adversarial Testing
One final advantage of civil rights trials is that they subject claims to a
higher level of adversarial testing. One might contend that our adversarial
system of justice inherently guarantees such rigor. Yet as plaintiffs' attorney
David Boies argued, the trial offers a different degree of engagement from, say,
an exchange of briefs: "Papers never meet each other -it's like people talking
past each other. The crucible of cross examination forces the witness to
confront the other side; they can't fall back on bumper sticker slogans like
marriage is between a man and a woman.""o' After the trial concluded, Boies
expanded on this theme, noting:
Well, it's easy to sit around and debate and throw around
opinions[, ]appeal to people's fear and prejudice, cite studies that either
don't exist or don't say what you say they do. In a court of law you've
got to come in and you've got to support those opinions. You've got to
stand up under oath and cross-examination. And what we saw at trial is
that it's very easy for the people who want to deprive gay and lesbian
citizens [of] the right to [marry], to make all sorts of statements and
campaign literature or in debates where they can't be cross-examined.
But when they come into court and they have to support those
opinions and they have to defend those opinions under oath and cross-
examination, those opinions just melt away. And that's what happened
here. There simply wasn't any evidence. There weren't any of those
studies. There weren't any empirical studies. That's just made up.
That's junk science.
103. Id. at 88o.
104. Id. at 2976, 2979.
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And it's easy to say that on television. But a witness stand is a lonely
place to lie. And when you come into court, you can't do that. And
that's what we proved. We put fear and prejudice on trial, and fear and
prejudice lost.o 6
Boies was not alone in this view. Writing for the New York Times, Adam Liptak
observed, "Trials do have some things to recommend them, including the
possibility of subjecting witnesses' factual assertions to cross-examination,
which the legal scholar John Henry Wigmore once called 'the greatest legal
engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.' Trials take place in public, and
they have been known to advance understanding."' 0 Margaret Talbot, writing
for the New Yorker, acknowledged conventional wisdom when she wrote, "You
sometimes hear it said that a courtroom is not the best venue for playing out
battles in the culture wars - better that they be fought in the legislature, or at
the ballot box, or even in the blogosphere."'os Nonetheless, Talbot continued:
"But following the Perry v. Schwarzenegger trial over the past three weeks has
been a reminder that a courtroom can also be a great and theatrical classroom,
where the values of thoroughness, precision in speech, and the obligation to
reply have a way of laying bare the fundamentals of certain rhetorical
positions.""o'
In the trial, the question of whether the plaintiffs had suffered institutional
humiliation was sometimes addressed directly, as discussed above. Cleaving
more closely to established doctrine, the plaintiffs also sought to establish
humiliation indirectly through discussions of whether bans on same-sex
marriage manifested animus against gays and lesbians. The Proponents' star
witness, David Blankenhorn, was particularly valuable to them because he had
a demonstrable track record of supporting the "equal dignity of gay love" while
opposing same-sex marriage."o This allowed the Proponents to take the
position that one could be pro-gay but still oppose same-sex marriage.
io6. CBS News' Face the Nation: August 8, 201o Transcript, CBS BROADCASTING INC. 6 (Aug. 8,
2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/pdf/FTN-o8o8io.pdf.
107. Adam Liptak, Trial in Same-Sex Marriage Case Is Challenged, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 201o, at
A14 .
1o8. Talbot, supra note 1o5.
iog. Id.
no. See Austin R. Nimocks, Perry v. Schwarzenegger District Court Trial Blog Posts, ALLIANCE
DEFENDING FREEDOM (Jan. 27, 2010), http://www.adfmedia.org/News/PRDetail/4897
("Mr. Blankenhorn throws a huge wrench into the plaintiffs' case since, as described by
some, he's 'one of them' and yet doesn't believe that same-sex 'marriage' is good for
society.").
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During cross examination, however, Boies swiftly revealed the instability of
this position. Blankenhorn based his opposition to same-sex marriage to the
right of children to be raised by the mother and father who gave birth to
them.' However, under cross-examination, Blankenhorn acknowledged
several points that undermined his position. For instance, Boies undercut
Blankenhorn's position that marriage was necessarily oriented toward
procreation by looking at Blankenhorn's own prior definitions of marriage."
Blankenhorn also conceded under cross-examination that adoptive parents
under many circumstances produced better child outcomes because they were
so rigorously screened."' As one commentator put it, Boies "demolished"
Blankenhorn on cross-examination."1
That view of the matter is perhaps supported by Blankenhorn's later
evolution to support same-sex marriage. Blankenhorn published an op-ed in
the New York Times announcing his changed position."s While he observed
that he had not changed any of the positions he had taken at trial, this was at
least arguably not the case. At trial, Blankenhorn observed that he had not
discerned any animus in the restriction of marriage to opposite-sex couples." 6
In the op-ed, however, Blankenhorn stated: "And to my deep regret, much of
the opposition to gay marriage seems to stem, at least in part, from an
underlying anti-gay animus. To me, a Southerner by birth whose formative
moral experience was the civil-rights movement, this fact is profoundly
disturbing.""'
CONCLUSION
If anything, Ackerman undersells the salience of his anti-humiliation
paradigm. The Supreme Court's decisions in the same-sex marriage context
hew more closely to the anti-humiliation principle of Brown than to the
heightened scrutiny framework of Loving. To use "dignity" as a tracer for the
in. Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 77, at 2744-45.
112. Id. at 2914-16.
113. Id. at 2794-95.
114. Frank Rich, Two Weddings, a Divorce, and 'Glee,' N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2010, http://www
.nytimes.com/2010/06/i3/opinion/3rich.html.
115. David Blankenhorn, How My View on Gay Marriage Changed, N.Y. TIMES, June
22, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2o12/o6/23/opinion/how-my-view-on-gay-marriage
-changed.html.
116. Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 77, at 2765.
117. Blankenhorn, supra note 115.
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"anti-humiliation principle" is to see that, in fact, the principle cuts a much
broader swath within and beyond gay-rights doctrine. These cases open the
door to the anti-humiliation principle in a manner that could meaningfully
transform constitutional jurisprudence more generally.
Endorsing the anti-humiliation doctrine raises the question of how the
Court should establish the existence of institutionalized humiliation. Ackerman
suggests two avenues: the judge's "situation-sense" and the Brandeis brief. Yet
the Court's jurisprudence suggests that these sources of information may not
be enough to overcome status quo bias, especially in civil rights cases where
settled norms are being challenged. Drawing on the trial in Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, I have argued that the civil rights trial may be an additional
resource for establishing institutionalized humiliation.
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